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Jorge M. Pacheco, Vítor V. Vasconcelos and Francisco C. Santos take stock of a growing body 
of research they have produced in recent years, with the aim of shedding light on whether 
bottom-up agreements can suffice in promoting the high levels of cooperation needed to avert 
dangerous climate change [1]. The current state of affairs leave little reason for optimism, given 
the steady rise in CO2 emissions [2]. The UNFCCC approach to seeking universal participation 
has thus been called into question, both by some policy makers and by academics who have 
established pessimistic theoretical predictions concerning the limited ability of international 
environmental agreements to improve upon what nation states would do in the absence of an 
agreement. Game theorists have predicted that self-enforcing agreements are likely to comprise 
only a handful of countries committing to unambitious emission abatement targets [3]. Clearly, 
this is incompatible with stabilizing CO2 concentrations at levels that significantly constrain the 
likelihood of dangerous climate change. The question than arises as to whether we can deliver on 
ambitious abatement targets by leveraging on unilateral action by countries or other sub- or 
supra-national entities (e.g. cities or blocs). This has recently been analyzed in game-theoretic 
contexts [4, 5], as well as in the governance literature [6], with more optimistic predictions 
compared to traditional models focusing on overarching agreements.  
Pacheco and colleagues have shed new light on the issue by analyzing the formation of climate 
treaties with evolutionary game theory. Briefly, the common setup utilized in the papers they 
review in [1] is that of a threshold public goods game (TPGG), where groups failing to 
coordinate on a minimum contribution face a high probabilistic loss [7]. Such features mirror the 
idea that a minimum number of participants is required in international environmental 
agreements, and that miscoordination on the target (underprovision of the public good) can lead 
to catastrophic consequences due to climate change. They enrich this setup with realistic features 
such as wealth inequality, threshold uncertainty and the presence of sanctioning institutions. The 
model departs from previous treatments of this TPGG by focusing on the dynamics of strategy 
adoption (here modelled as evolutionary, in the sense of imitation of successful strategies), rather 
than on equilibrium behavior. A significant advantage of the evolutionary framework is that it 
allows discriminating between equilibria in terms of their stability, or prevalence over time. 
One of the main conclusions that Pacheco et al. [1] reach is that risk perception crucially 
determines the prospects of success: when the threat of collective disaster is perceived as remote, 
cooperation cannot be sustained, no matter what the other model specifications are. Conversely, 
high-risk perception especially when coupled with cooperation nucleating in small groups and 
expanding into larger ones, allows for an ‘evolutionary escape from the climate dilemma’. An 
important caveat to this promising way out of the climate stalemate is that it is hostage to the 
presence of uncertainty on the threshold. The authors find that group achievement in avoiding it 
sharply declines when only the distribution of the threshold is known, leading to a regime shift. 
This finding confirms theoretical and empirical work showing that resource variability and 
disagreement over the location of the tipping point can trigger a collapse of cooperation [8, 9].  
Sadly, at present the scientific and political discussions over the location of the threshold for 
dangerous climate change do not converge on a single value, whether in terms of admissible 
CO2 concentrations or temperature increase [10]. Shedding light on the risks associated with 
dangerous climate change and reducing scientific uncertainty thus appear to be further public 
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